

## ATION COMMISSION BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPOR

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
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AZ CORP COMMISSION

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GARY PIERCE, Chairman PAUL NEWMAN SANDRA D. KENNEDY **BOB STUMP** BRENDA BURNS

IN THE MATTER OF THE FORMAL COMPLAINT OF SWING FIRST GOLF LLC AGAINST JOHNSON UTILITIES LLC

DOCKET NO. WS-02987A-08-0049

REPLY TO JOHNSON UTILITIES' **RESPONSE** 

Swing First Golf LLC ("Swing First"), hereby replies to "Johnson Utilities' Response in Opposition to Swing First Golf's Pleading Captioned Withdrawal of Complaint" ("Johnson's Response"). Johnson Utilities LLC ("Johnson") claims that Swing First cannot withdraw its voluntary complaint. Johnson's Response is contrary to its positions in the Superior Court case and misstates the law. Johnson's Response is the latest example of its bad-faith litigation tactics. Johnson asks the Commission to help it strain Swing First's resources by forcing it to litigate the same case in two different dockets. Johnson's Response should be rejected.

#### JOHNSON IS ARGUING OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF ITS MOUTH

#### Johnson Urged Swing First to Withdraw Its Complaint A

In its September 21, 2011, omnibus pleading in this docket, Johnson urged Swing First to withdraw its complaint:

Johnson Utilities, LLC ("Johnson Utilities" or the "Company") strenuously opposes the Motion and urges that instead of further delaying this proceeding, SFG should withdraw its complaint against the Company."<sup>2</sup>

Johnson agreed with Swing First that "there is no reason to waste the Commission's resources on a moot case.""

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See, Notice of Inappropriate Discovery and Litigation Tactics, dated February 20, 2009, in this docket. <sup>2</sup> "Johnson Utilities' (1) Opposition to Swing First Golf's Motion For Continuance; (2) Proposed Procedural Schedule; and (3) Notice of Change of Address of Legal Counsel," dated September 21, 2011, at p. 1. Emphasis added.

Just six days later, Swing First agreed to withdraw its complaint. Incredibly, Johnson has pivoted 180 degrees and now opposes Swing First's withdrawal.

#### B Johnson Tells the Court a Different Story

First, it is important to note that Johnson chose to file its claims against Swing First in Superior Court. Johnson filed its Superior Court Complaint on January 9, 2008.<sup>3</sup> With this filing, Johnson acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to provide it complete relief.

Swing First's Commission Complaint was not filed until January 25, 2008. Because the correct rates for irrigation service were still at issue, Swing First moved to dismiss the Court case on the basis, among others, that Commission expertise was needed to sort out the rate issues. Johnson vigorously opposed the motion, arguing that the Court had jurisdiction.

JUC certainly did not sue Swing First in order to determine the correct amount that JUC should have billed Swing First. Rather, JUC asserts a breach of contract/collection claim predicated on a service contract subject to utility rates that have already been approved by the ACC as reasonable. JUC's contract claim does not implicate any technical issues whatsoever, but merely alleges that Swing First has failed to pay for services at the filed rates, and has not met its contractual obligation to make minimum effluent purchases from JUC. This case has absolutely nothing to do with the ACC's plenary constitutional authority to determine just and reasonable rates.<sup>4</sup>

Subsequently, Johnson told the Commission in this very docket that its tariffed rate for effluent deliveries is \$0.62 per thousand gallons delivered.<sup>5</sup> Johnson told the Commission that its tariffed rate for CAP-Water deliveries is \$0.83 per thousand gallons delivered.<sup>6</sup> Finally, Johnson told the Commission that it "is legally bound to charge the Commission-approved rates and charges." Swing First agrees with all these assertions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Johnson Utilities L.L.C. v. Swing First Golf, L.L.C. (Maricopa County Superior Court Docket No. CV 2008-000141).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, dated May 7, 2008. Emphasis added.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 4, 2008, at p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> *Id*.

With these admissions, we now know the appropriate tariff rates for all water sales at issue. The Commission need not set rates or determine the appropriate rates to be charged. The Court can now do its work.

II The Superior Court Has Complete Jurisdiction

A Johnson Misleads the Commission

First Johnson inappropriately relies on a 2008 Order from Judge Duneyant. Johnson's

First, Johnson inappropriately relies on a 2008 Order from Judge Dunevant. Johnson's reliance is misplaced. Judge Fink, the current judge, has now set the case for trial. He is not waiting for any action by the Commission. Judge Dunevant's 2008 Order is moot.

Second, Johnson falsely summarizes Judge Dunevant's ruling: "Judge Dunevant, the original judge assigned in the Superior Court Case, appropriately recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to address disputes over rates and charges and customer service." Judge Dunevant never said this.

Third, Johnson misleads the Commission by omitting Judge Dunevant's key qualifying phrase. The Judge actually said (with the omitted phrase underlined). "Regardless of whether this Court has concurrent jurisdiction, the Court is of the opinion that it should refrain from becoming involved until the Corporation Commission has made its initial determination."

Now, as just discussed, there is nothing left for the Commission to determine. The parties all agree as to the correct rates and tariffs for the services at issue.

The Court is now free to exercise its jurisdiction, and has done just that. It has removed the case from the inactive calendar and set it for trial.

### B Johnson Knowingly Misstates the Law

Johnson misled the Commission by incorrectly summarizing Judge Dunevant's minute order and by omitting a key qualifying phrase. Johnson further misleads the Commission by knowingly misstating the law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Response at p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Minute Order dated May 27, 2008.

Johnson cites *Qwest Corporation v. Kelly*, 204 Ariz. 25, 59 P.3d 789 (Ariz. App. Div. 2, 2002), but twists its summary to make it appear that *Kelly* supports Johnson's position. *Kelly* is actually contrary to Johnson's position.

In *Kelly*, customers filed a class action lawsuit against Qwest arising from their purchase of Qwest's linebacker service. The customers asserted both contract and tort claims. Qwest moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Commission had "exclusive and plenary jurisdiction over all matters." The *Kelly* court disagreed, concluding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

First, like in Swing First's court case against Johnson, the fundamental issue in *Kelly* was whether the utility committed a civil wrong against its customer(s).

[The customer] had raised "relatively simple tort and contract issues revolving around a central inquiry: whether, under traditional judicial principles, appellees committed a civil wrong against appellant."<sup>11</sup>

Judge Fink similarly ruled that the jury would have to apply contract principals to determine whether Johnson overcharged Swing First:

The principal difficulty is that, as the Corporation Commission found, Johnson's records have been inadequate. The Court is left to fill in the gaps. Filling in gaps is an exercise in factfinding that must be left for the jury. 12

Similarly, in addition to the contract issues, the jury must decide multiple tort issues—including trespass, negligence, and defamation—which the *Kelly* court says are clearly outside the Commission's jurisdiction.

However, the claims' most important aspects involve facts and theories of tort and contract far afield of the Commission's area of expertise and statutory responsibility. Indeed, appellant's tort and contract claims are the type of traditional claims with which our trial courts of general jurisdiction are most familiar and capable of dealing. <sup>13</sup>

The Kelly court concluded the complaint should proceed in court.

<sup>10</sup> Qwest v. Kelly at 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Id. at 32, quoting Campbell v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 120 Ariz. 426, 586 P.2d 987 (App. 1978).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Minute Entry dated January 5, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Owest v. Kelly at 32.

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[The] complaint raises claims that revolve "around a central inquiry: whether, under traditional judicial principles, [Qwest] committed a civil wrong against [the tenants]." Likewise, as in Campbell, "these issues predominate, [therefore] it is clearly not essential for the courts to 'refrain from exercising (their) jurisdiction until after 'the specialized administrative agency' has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.<sup>14</sup>

It is not necessary to accept Swing First's interpretation of *Kelly*; Johnson fully understands what *Kelly* really stands for. Here is what Johnson told the Court that the *Kelly* case means:

The court held that plaintiff's claims did not implicate technical issues peculiar to the utilities industries, but rather "revolve[d] 'around the central inquiry: whether, under traditional judicial principals, [Qwest] committed a civil wrong against [the tenants]." Although the subjects of "tariffs" and "rates" would certainly come up in the litigation, the technicalities of those subjects were not central to the dispute. In that regard, the superior court was found to be fully capable of adjudicating the claims, obviating the need to defer to the ACC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. <sup>15</sup>

# III THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER JOHNSON'S SO-CALLED COUNTERCLAIMS

The Commission has "no implied powers and its powers do not exceed those to be derived from a strict construction of the Constitution and implementing statutes." The Commission is not a court of general jurisdiction.

The legislature provided the Commission jurisdiction to hear complaints from customers concerning violations by public service corporations.

Complaint may be made by the commission of its own motion, or by any person or association of persons by petition or complaint in writing, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public service corporation in violation, or claimed to be in violation, of any provision of law or any order or rule of the commission ....<sup>17</sup>

The legislature <u>did not</u> enlarge the Commission's jurisdiction to hear complaints from public service corporations against customers. Nor is there anything in the Constitution that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> *Id.* at 34, citing *Campbell*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, dated May 7, 2008, at p. 4. Citations omitted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Wright, 64 Ariz. 129, 139, 166 P.2d 943, 949 (1946).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> A.R.S. § 40-246A.

would allow the Commission to hear a complaint by a public service corporation against a customer. If a public service corporation has a claim against a customer, it can only be brought in court.

Johnson is indisputably a public service corporation.<sup>18</sup> Swing First is Johnson's customer. The Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear claims or counterclaims by Johnson against its Swing First.

Again, Johnson knows that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear its claims against Swing First. For the Court, Johnson illustrated the consequences of a contrary view.

The judicial system would be off-limits for every claim brought by a utility provider against a customer who was delinquent in paying his or her utility bill according to the terms of the applicable service contract. The ACC would need to hire an army of hearing officers to handle all the claims brought by [Johnson], Arizona Public Service, Qwest, and every other public service corporation trying to collect from those customers.<sup>19</sup>

#### IV This Case Has Not Proceeded Too Far

Johnson argues on October 4, 2011, that this case has proceeded too far for Swing First to withdraw its complaint. This is ludicrous for two reasons:

First, Johnson's argument is belied by its own statements. Just two weeks earlier, on September 21, 2011, Johnson urged Swing First to withdraw its complaint, agreeing that it would be a waste of the parties' resources to try the case. The case has not proceeded <u>at all</u> since September 21. It is nonsensical to maintain that the case has somehow proceeded too far in just two weeks.

Second, Johnson also submitted the following proposed procedural schedule to be followed if Swing First did not withdraw its complaint.

Update (if any) of SFG Direct Testimony

Monday, October 24, 2011

Johnson Utilities Rebuttal Testimony

Friday, December 23, 2011

SFG Surrebuttal Testimony

Monday, January 23, 2012

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Constitution, Article 15, § 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, dated May 7, 2008, at 5.

End of Discovery

Johnson Utilities Rejoinder Testimony

Hearing (estimated three days)

Wednesday, January 25, 2012 Monday, February 6, 2012 Tuesday, February 14, 2012

As is clear from the proposed schedule, this case has barely begun; it has hardly proceeded at all. Johnson is not prejudiced in any way by Swing First's withdrawal of its complaint.

#### V Trying Two Cases Simultaneously Would Severely Prejudice Swing First

On September 9, 2011, Swing First filed a copy of the Court's scheduling order, which shows that trial is scheduled to begin on March 13, 2012, less than six-months from now. The Judge has stated that he is unlikely to allow any further delays. Until March, the parties will be quite busy with depositions, dispositive motions, mediation, and trial preparation.

Johnson is represented by one law firm at the Commission and two more firms in the Court case. Swing First is represented by the same sole practitioner in both dockets. Johnson is owned by a multi-millionaire. Swing First is owned by an LLC, managed by a young man just getting started in life. It would severely prejudice Swing First to force it to try these cases at the same time.

#### VI Swing First Does Not Need Johnson's Permission to Withdraw Its Complaint

Swing First does not need Johnson's permission to withdraw its complaint. However, even assuming *arguendo* that Johnson's permission was required, that permission was granted. Johnson did much more than state that it agreed to a withdrawal, it <u>urged</u> Swing First to withdraw its complaint.

Further, as just discussed, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider Johnson's socalled counterclaims. The Commission is in the position of an Arizona court considering nonjurisdictional counterclaims (perhaps federal claims or claims barred by statutes of limitation). Non-jurisdictional counterclaims cannot be asserted to oppose a complaint withdrawal.

Essentially, Johnson is telling the Commission that Swing First cannot withdraw its own complaint because Johnson has filed non-jurisdictional counterclaims. Johnson would turn the legislature's limited grant of jurisdiction to hear customer complaints into a trap from which a

customer cannot escape. This would have a chilling effect on the willingness of a customer to 1 2 file a legitimate complaint if it would be forced to deal with utility counterclaims and could not 3 withdraw its complaint. **CONCLUSION** 4 VII 5 Johnson's Response is a deeply cynical attempt to manipulate the Commission's 6 complaint process to harm Swing First. Johnson asks the Commission to assist Johnson's long-7 running campaign to bleed Swing First dry. Swing First is confident that the Commission will 8 not allow itself to be used so transparently. 9 Johnson's Response is meritless and should be rejected. 10 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on October 7, 2011. 11 roug C, Month 12 13 Craig A. Marks 14 Craig A. Marks, PLC 15 10645 N. Tatum Blvd., Ste. 200-676 16 17 Phoenix, AZ 85028 18 Craig.Marks@azbar.org Attorney for Swing First Golf LLC 19 20

Original and 13 copies filed on October 7, 2011, to:

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